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I. INTRODUCTION
Murphy v. NCAA1 kicked off a new era in sports betting in the United
States, with many states authorizing sports betting in various forms, seemingly
without regard to potential preemption by the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”)2 and related Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or
“Commission”) regulations. As of December 31, 2020, eighteen states and the
District of Columbia have officially legalized sports betting.3 This group
includes Nevada, Delaware, Montana, and Oregon, all of which already had
some form of sports betting prior to the ruling.4 These state markets continue to
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Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
2
7 U.S.C. §§ 1–23.
3
COMMERCIAL GAMING REVENUE TRACKER, AM. GAMING ASS’N 5 (2021),
https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Q4-Email-PDF.pdf.
4
See generally Online Gaming and Sports Betting in the United States, AM. BAR
ASS’N
BUS.
L.
SECTION
(Sept.
13,
2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/materials/2019/annual
_materials/online_gaming/ (stating that PASPA expressly excluded from its reach
pari-mutuel sports betting—horse racing, dog racing, and jai alai—and grandfathered
in those states that already had some form of authorized sports gambling on their
books, specifically not prohibiting them from continuing to regulate and authorize
those preexisting operations. This state-by-state carveout resulted in the federal
authorization of licensed sports betting pools in Nevada and sports lotteries, such as
parlays, in Oregon, Delaware, and Montana).
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grow, increasing in 2020 by sixty-five percent and sixty-nine percent year over
year in revenue and in handle (money in wagers), respectively. 5 In 2020, the
state-legalized sports gaming handle totaled $21.5 billion, while revenue totaled
$1.5 billion, “despite widespread sportsbook shutdowns and an abbreviated
calendar of major sporting events.”6
Additionally, some gambling enterprises are expanding beyond sports
into other event betting. In 2019, the Division of Gaming Enforcement in New
Jersey allowed licensed sportsbook operators to accept bets on the winners of
Academy Award categories, including Best Picture and Best Supporting Actor. 7
In 2020, the Indiana Gaming Commission followed suit.8
This article examines various sections of the CEA and related CFTC
regulations,9 and explains that the Commission may have jurisdiction over some
traditional sports bets because such bets can be viewed as binary, other options,
or other types of swaps. These bets may also constitute event contracts if they
are listed on or cleared by a CFTC-registered entity.
Section I lays down the basics of the Murphy decision and its
significance for state sports gambling. Section II details the interplay between
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”) and the CEA.
Section III summarizes the various court-developed theories under which federal
law preempts state law. The section then examines how the CEA and CFTC
regulations might expressly and/or implicitly preempt state sports betting
regulation, including through a discussion of various CEA sections providing the
CFTC authority over particular commodity interests10 and, in some cases,
limiting their availability to the public. Section IV highlights several CFTCjurisdictional commodity interests that sports bets resemble or may constitute
and the related CEA/CFTC regulatory scheme, shedding further light on the basis
for the possible federal preemption of state sports betting. Section V discusses
some potential approaches that the CFTC might take in response to the
proliferation of state-authorized sports betting and the legal underpinnings for
those potential approaches. Section VI discusses private rights of action under
the CEA.

AM. GAMING ASS’N, supra note 3, at 4.
Id.
7
Richard Morgan, You Can Now Place Legal Bets on the Oscars in New Jersey,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 11, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/02/11/you-can-now-placelegal-bets-on-the-oscars-in-new-jersey/.
8
Brandon Smith, Indiana Gaming Commission Authorizes Bets on Academy
Awards,
IND.
PUBLIC
MEDIA
(Jan.
23,
2020),
https://indianapublicmedia.org/news/indiana-gaming-commission-authorizes-betson-academy-awards.php.
9
17 C.F.R. §§ 1–199 (2020).
10
See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (defining “commodity interest”).
5
6
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II. MURPHY V. NCAA
A. Summary
In Murphy v. NCAA, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C § 3702(1)
of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), which
generally made it unlawful for a state to authorize sports gambling schemes,
“violate[d] the anticommandeering rule” and was therefore unconstitutional. 11
At issue in Murphy was a 2014 New Jersey law repealing provisions of a thenexisting law that prohibited certain sports gambling.12 The Court explained that
“the anticommandeering principle is simple and basic,”13 and that “even where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the states to require
or prohibit those acts.”14 As a result of Murphy, states appear to be proceeding
under the assumption that they can authorize sports gambling and it is federally
legal unless Congress acts to specifically prohibit sports gambling. That is not
necessarily so, for the reasons that follow.
B. Significance
Murphy does not remove sports gambling from the reach of all federal
regulation. The Supreme Court explained in Murphy that, although federal law
generally trumps state and local law, that concept is not unlimited. The Court
first stated that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“federal law is the ‘supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding[,]’”15 which means that
“when federal and state law conflict, federal law prevails and state law is
preempted.”16 The Court added, however, that “preemption is based on a federal
law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the States.”17 Thus, although
the Court held that § 3702(1) of PASPA violated principles of federalism
(specifically, the anticommandeering rule) by seeking to regulate the states rather
than private actors (such as by prohibiting the states from permitting sports
gambling), the Court said in dicta that if Congress had instead passed a law
directly prohibiting sports gambling, such law would have preempted state laws
permitting gambling: “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it
elects not to do so, each State is free to act.”18 Therefore, if a sports bet is a form

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id. at 1472.
Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1477 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
Id. at 1476 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1481.
Id. at 1484 (emphasis added).
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of a swap,19 several sections of the CEA apply. For example, CEA § 2(e)20—
which prohibits most individuals (those who are not “eligible contract
participants” (“ECPs”))21 from entering swaps other than on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market (“DCM”)—arguably preempts state laws
to the contrary. It follows that state laws that permit sports gambling by nonECPs in the form of a swap conflict with CEA § 2(e) and thus may be preempted
by it.
The Supreme Court indicated that Congress could preempt state sports
gambling regulation by regulating such activity directly.22 While the CEA § 2(e)
prohibition on non-ECPs engaging in swaps can hardly be considered direct
federal regulation of sports gambling, it is direct federal regulation of swap
agreements, contracts, or transactions involving non-ECPs. Thus, to the extent
that state-authorized sports bets constitute swaps, such transactions may violate
federal law. In other words, CEA § 2(e) may preempt the application of any state
law that permits sports gambling constituting swaps with non-ECPs entered other
than on or subject to the rules of a DCM. If sports bets are “event contracts,”
options, or leveraged “retail commodity transactions,” they may violate other
CEA provisions and/or CFTC regulations.

III.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CEA AND UIGEA

Although this article does not include a comprehensive treatment of
federal gambling law, a brief mention of the UIGEA is warranted. The UIGEA
prohibits any person “engaged in the business of betting or wagering” from
knowingly accepting various common forms of payment in connection with the
participation of another person in “unlawful Internet gambling.”23 It also broadly
defines “unlawful Internet gambling” as:
[T]o place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit
a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (defines the term “swap”).
7 U.S.C. § 2(e).
21
The term “eligible contract participant” is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(18)(A)(xi)
and generally excludes individuals other than, acting for his or her own account:
19
20

[A]n individual who has amounts invested on a discretionary
basis, the aggregate of which is in excess of—
(I) $10,000,000; or
(II) $5,000,000 and who enters into the agreement, contract, or
transaction in order to hedge an asset owned or liability incurred,
or reasonably likely to be owned or incurred, by the individual[.]
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (stating that “Congress can regulate sports gambling
directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act.”).
23
31 U.S.C. § 5363.
22
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part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under
any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal lands
in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise
made.24
The UIGEA defines a “bet or wager” broadly as a person “staking or
risking . . . something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting
event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the
person or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain
outcome[.]”25
However, the UIGEA excludes the following (“the UIGEA
Exclusions”) from the “bet or wager” definition:
(ii) any transaction conducted on or subject to the rules of a
registered entity or exempt board of trade under the
Commodity Exchange Act;
(iii) any over-the-counter derivative instrument;
(iv) any other transaction that—
(I) is excluded or exempt from regulation under the
Commodity Exchange Act; or
(II) is exempt from State gaming or bucket shop laws under
section 12(e) of the Commodity Exchange Act or section 28(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[.]26
The creation of the UIGEA Exclusions in a federal gambling statute
appears to indicate that Congress recognized that sports bets bear more than a
passing resemblance to financial products that are regulated by the CFTC (or
excluded or exempt from such regulation by the terms of clause (iv) of the
UIGEA Exclusions) and sought to ensure the preeminence of the CFTC
regulatory scheme for derivatives over other federal and state regulation, even
when that scheme called for an exclusion or exemption.27 Thus, while it may
seem odd to someone unfamiliar with UIGEA for the CEA to possibly apply to
sports betting, Congress has recognized for many years the potential overlap
between sports betting and financial products that are (or would be, but for a

24

31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A).
31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A).
26
31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E).
27
This appears to have included the over-the-counter derivatives mentioned in
clause (ii) of the UIGEA Exclusions at the time the UIGEA was enacted in 2006. See
generally Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106554, 114 Stat. 2763A, and the swap exemption in Part 35 of the CFTC’s rules, as in
effect in 2006.
25
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congressional or CFTC exclusion or exemption) subject to the CEA/CFTC
regulation.28
Notwithstanding this potential overlap, the CFTC has not focused its
attention on sports betting because the states and/or other federal law generally
prohibited it, except for certain activity grandfathered in by PASPA at the time
of its enactment.29 Consequently, the CFTC has not sued any casinos, horse
tracks, etc. in the United States expressly permitted under PASPA,
notwithstanding that: (1) sports bets may be characterized as binary options; (2)
the CFTC has asserted in a federal district court complaint that binary options
are swaps;30 and (3) CEA § 2(e) makes it illegal for a non-ECP to enter into a
swap other than on, or subject to the rules of, a DCM.
Now that PASPA has been repealed, however, and state-authorized
gambling has taken off, the CFTC may consider the possibility that sports betting
in its many forms, not just on CFTC-regulated registered entities, may still be
prohibited by the CEA/CFTC regulation, regardless of state laws that authorize
it.

IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

A. Brief Overview of Preemption Doctrine
The basis of the preemption of state law by federal law is the United
States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which provides that “the laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”31 The doctrine generally provides that federal
law supersedes conflicting state laws. However, even when a statute contains an
express preemption provision, “that does not immediately end the inquiry
because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’s displacement of
state law still remains.”32 Accordingly, the inquiry next turns to whether federal

28

See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E); see also CEA § 12(e)(2) (repealed 2000) (preempting
state gaming and bucket shop laws with respect to specified activity); see, e.g., John
T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Modern Day Bucket Shops? Fantasy Sports and
Illegal Exchanges, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 619 (2019) (demonstrating that some
scholars have also been aware of the potential overlap for some time).
29
See 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (stating PASPA’s unlawful sports gambling prohibition
does not apply to various activities including certain casinos and animal racing).
30
See Complaint at 10, 30, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Yukom
Commc’ns Ltd., No. 19-CV-05416 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2019) (asserting that “[t]he
binary option transactions offered by the Yukom Enterprise are swaps, as defined by
the [CEA]” and listing prongs (i) to (iii) of the CEA’s swap definition (CEA
§ 1a(47)(A)(i)–(iii)).
31
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
32
See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
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law has impliedly preempted state law when its structure and purpose implicitly
reflect Congress’s preemptive intent.
There are two subcategories of implied preemption: “field preemption”
and “conflict preemption.” Field preemption occurs when a pervasive scheme of
federal regulation implicitly precludes supplementary state regulation, or when
states attempt to regulate a field where there is clearly a dominant federal
interest.33 Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both federal and
state regulations is an impossibility (“impossibility preemption”),34 or when state
law poses an “obstacle” to the accomplishment of the “full purposes and
objectives” of Congress (“obstacle preemption”).35 However, as the Seventh
Circuit has pointed out, the lines separating various types of preemption are
sometimes unclear.36
The Supreme Court has employed a presumption against preemption,
with certain exceptions. In a 2016 case, the Court stated, “that where there is an
express preemption provision, it would not invoke any presumption against
preemption, but rather would focus on the plain wording of the preemption
provision, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’s
preemptive intent.”37 Importantly, the Court has noted that express preemption
does not foreclose implied preemption38 and explained that express preemption
provisions do not obviate the need for analysis of an individual statute’s
preemptive effect.39 Thus, even though CEA § 12(e)(2) is an express preemption
provision, that alone does not end the preemption analysis of the CEA versus
states sports betting.
B. Preemption under the CEA
The CFTC recognized in a 2008 concept release that its regulatory
regime and the CEA might preempt state gaming laws.40 The scope of what the
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
Fla Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
35
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941).
36
See Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1154 n.2
(7th Cir. 1992) (lines between express, field, and conflict preemption are not always
clear-cut); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (stating that
“[b]y referring to these three categories, we should not be taken to mean that they are
rigidly distinct.”).
37
See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).
38
See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995).
39
Id. at 289.
40
See Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event
Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. No. 89 (May 7, 2008) (“2008 Event Contract Concept
Release”) (asking at 25,673 “[w]hat are the implications of possibly preempting state
gaming laws with respect to event contracts and markets that are treated as
Commission-regulated or exempted transactions[]” and at 25,670 “[h]ow should the
Commission address the potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the
possible pre-emption of state gaming laws?”).
33
34
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CFTC was considering in the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release41 was
broader than the term as used in CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C) (i.e., event contracts listed
for trading or cleared by CFTC-regulated registered entities). The implication is
that the CEA and the CFTC’s regulatory regime might preempt state gaming
laws not only with respect to CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C) event contracts, but also with
respect to sports betting more broadly.
The CEA contains at least three provisions broadly relevant to the
CEA’s preemptive effect (although only one expressly uses the word “preempt”):
CEA §§ 2(a)(1)(A) (granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over, among other
things, accounts, agreements and transactions involving swaps or futures traded
on any market), 4c(b) (granting the CFTC plenary authority over option
transactions), and 12(e) (stating expressly what the CEA does (§ 12(e)(2)) and
does not (§ 12(e)(1)) preempt, including with respect to state law).
i.

Express Preemption under the CEA § 12(e)

CEA § 12(e) expressly addresses whether the CEA preempts other
federal and state laws in the context of specific transactions. On its face, it
appears that § 12(e) does not support various elements of the CEA/CFTC
regulatory scheme preempting state gaming laws. However, when viewed in the
proper context, including consideration of other CEA sections, the opposite may
be true with respect to transactions that are commodity interests.
a. CEA § 12(e)(1)
CEA § 12(e)(1) states:

41

In the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, the CFTC described event contracts,
“for ease of reference and to avoid classification issues,” as financial agreements
offered by markets commonly referred to as event, prediction, or information
markets that:
[A]re neither dependent on, nor do they necessarily
relate to, market prices or broad-based measures of economic or
commercial activity.[] Rather, event contracts may be based on
eventualities and measures as varied as the world’s population in
the year 2050, the results of political elections, or the outcome of
particular entertainment events.
Id. at 25,669. The CFTC distinguished such contracts from more traditional
contracts, adding that “[t]he term event contract is not intended to encompass
contracts that generate trading prices that predictably correlate with market prices or
broad-based measures of economic or commercial activity, or contracts which
substantially replicate other commodity derivatives contracts, such as binary options
on exchange rates or the price of crude oil[,]” which the agency declared “are
unambiguously subject to CFTC regulation.” Id.
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(1) Nothing in this Act shall supersede or preempt—
(A) criminal prosecution under any Federal criminal statute;
(B) the application of any Federal or State statute (except as
provided in paragraph (2)), including any rule or regulation
thereunder, to any transaction in or involving any commodity,
product, right, service, or interest—
(i) that is not conducted on or subject to the rules of a
registered entity or exempt board of trade;
(ii) (except as otherwise specified by the Commission by rule
or regulation) that is not conducted on or subject to the rules of
any board of trade, exchange, or market located outside the
United States, its territories or possessions; or
(iii) that is not subject to regulation by the Commission under
section 4c or 19; or (C) the application of any Federal or State
statute, including any rule or regulation thereunder, to any
person required to be registered or designated under this Act
who shall fail or refuse to obtain such registration or
designation.
Given that no sport gaming businesses appear to be registered or
designated under the CEA, many people may wonder if CEA § 12(e)(1) offers
some reprieve from the CEA for these businesses. This likely would be a mistake,
given that the non-CEA preemption situations enumerated in § 12(e)(1) are quite
limited and that many sports bets may be both options and swaps.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act42
amended CEA § 2(d) to provide that the only CEA sections that apply to swaps
are those listed as such in CEA § 2(d); CEA § 12(e)(1) is not among them. As a
result, to the extent that CEA § 12(e)(1) would otherwise not expressly preempt
state regulation affecting a swap, CEA preemption of such state regulation is still
possible under other CEA sections (e.g., § 2(a)(1)(A) or § 2(e)).43
Also, the impact of CEA § 12(e)(1) is limited: it is generally thought to
provide states with merely concurrent jurisdiction,44 thus preserving any

42

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 124 Stat. 1376, 1747–48 (2010).
In contrast, per 7 U.S.C. § 2(d), 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) does apply to swaps. Thus, to
the extent that § 7 U.S.C. 16(e)(2) preempts state gaming or bucket shop prohibitions
or regulations without specifically referring to swaps, that preemption also applies to
swaps fitting within the parameters of § 7 U.S.C. 12(e)(2).
44
See Barry Taylor-Brill, Cracking the Preemption Code: The New Model for OTC
Derivatives, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 5 (2019) (explaining that CEA § 12(e)
provides the states with concurrent jurisdiction).
43
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applicable conflict preemption45 (in addition to express preemption under
§ 12(e)(2)).46
b. CEA § 12(e)(2)
CEA § 12(e)(2)47 specifies that the CEA preempts state and local
gaming and bucket shop laws48 with respect to several enumerated transactions
that are excluded or exempted from the CEA.49 Although § 12(e)(2) on its face
seems oddly underinclusive regarding the scope of the CEA’s preemption of state
gaming laws,50 the CEA’s preemptive effect is quite broad in that regard. It
would be strange if the CEA did not preempt state and local gaming laws
applicable to swaps falling outside the expressly preempted categories listed in
CEA § 12(e)(2), given the extremely broad and detailed CFTC oversight regime
applicable to swaps that Congress enacted in Dodd-Frank.51 One way to look at
this is that, in the heat of the legislative process, Congress simply neglected to
add to CEA § 12(e)(2) suitable new preemption provisions related to swaps to
reflect the new CFTC swap oversight regime.52
45

See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D); 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b).
See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 203, 204 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(discussing CEA § 12(e)(1) and finding that the CEA does not preempt recovery
under state common-law theories in absence of conflict between state and federal
statutory schemes). See also Stuber v. Hill 170 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (D. Kan.
2001) (referencing Mallen v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. for holding that the CEA
does not preempt recovery under state common-law theories in absence of conflict).
47
7 U.S.C. § 16 (e)(2).
48
For a discussion of the history of state anti-bucket shop statutes and the CEA, see
Kevin T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 657, 670 (1982).
49
An express preemption provision, such as 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2), is arguably
necessary as a legal basis for preemption because the case for implicit preemption
may be weak in the case of a federal regulatory vacuum (i.e., where the CEA or the
CFTC has excluded or exempted agreements, contracts, and transactions from the
CEA/CFTC regulation). Without 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2), state law arguably would apply
in such situations, which could undermine the Congressional or CFTC intent behind
the exclusion or exemption.
50
7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) expressly preempts state and local gaming laws only in cases
where certain products or trading venues are excluded from the CEA without also
expressly preempting state law as to commodity interests described by CEA
§ 2(a)(1)(A) or § 4c(b).
51
It would be similarly odd for § 4c(b) not to preempt state and local gaming laws,
to the extent they are options, given the CFTC’s plenary options authority. See
infra Section IV.B.ii.b and note 163.
52
7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)(A) and 7 U.S.C. § 2(e) (The fact that § 16(e)(2)(A) preempts
State and local gaming and bucket shop laws with respect to transactions executed
on an electronic trading facility excluded from the CEA under 7 U.S.C. § 2(e)
46
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Also, CEA § 12(e)(2) is on the list (in CEA § 2(d)) of CEA sections that
apply to swaps. Thus, CEA § 12(e)(2) should at least preempt state and local
gaming laws applicable to swaps within the categories enumerated therein.
No court has determined what, if any, preemption the CEA is afforded
over gaming swaps yet. But given that the presence of an express preemption
provision in a statute is not the end of the preemption analysis, 53 one might expect
a court considering the scope of the CEA’s preemptive effect with respect to state
and local sports gaming regulation would include an implied preemption analysis
in addition to considering CEA § 12(e)(2).
ii. Implied Preemption under CEA §§ 2(a)(1)(A) and 4c(b)
a. CEA § 2(a)(1)(A)
CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the CFTC, with
limited exceptions, with respect to futures, options, and swaps traded on DCM, 54
swap execution facility (“SEF”),55 or any other board of trade, exchange, or
market, and transactions subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to
CEA § 19. Section 2(a)(1)(A) also states that—except for the foregoing
exclusive jurisdiction language—nothing in CEA § 2 supersedes or limits the

supports this view: prior to Dodd-Frank, 7 U.S.C. § 2(e) provided an exclusion
related to electronic trading facilities, which are no longer mentioned, instead
rendering it unlawful for non-ECPs to enter into swaps other than on or subject to
the rules of a DCM. There is no mention in 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) of any preemptive
effect on State and local gaming and bucket shop laws of the new swap regulatory
regime introduced by Dodd-Frank. It would be odd for Congress to introduce such a
pervasive regime only to have states upend it by permitting transactions prohibited
by the new regime).
53
See supra Section IV.A (briefly discussing the Supreme Court’s preemption case
law).
54
A DCM, defined in 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 and also known as a “futures exchange,” is a
“board of trade” designated as a contract market by the CFTC. A “board of trade,” is
defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(6) as an “organized exchange or other trading facility.”
Those terms, in turn, are defined in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(37) and (51).
55
A SEF is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(50) as:
[A] trading system or platform in which multiple
participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by
accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the
facility or system, through any means of interstate commerce,
including any trading facility, that—(A) facilitates the execution
of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a designated contract
market.
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jurisdiction of the SEC or other regulatory authorities under federal or state laws
nor restricts them from carrying out their responsibilities under such laws. 56
Depending on how a gambling business is organized and operates, it
may fall within one or more of the DCM, SEF, or board of trade definitions. Even
if a gambling business does not fall within any of the foregoing defined terms, it
still may constitute an exchange or market, which are broader terms than any of
the others. Thus, to the extent that swaps, futures, or options are traded on a
DCM, SEF, or any other platform, state law would appear to be preempted by
the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction.57
b. CEA § 4c(b)
CEA § 4c(b), the CFTC’s plenary options authority, states:
No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or
confirm the execution of, any transaction involving any
commodity regulated under this Act which is of the character
of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an
“option” . . . contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission prohibiting any such transaction or allowing any
such transaction under such terms and conditions as the
Commission shall prescribe.
CFTC Rule 32.2 makes it unlawful to engage in any transaction in
interstate commerce that is a commodity option transaction unless it is conducted
in compliance with all applicable CEA and CFTC swap authority, unless the
transaction meets the terms of the trade option exemption (“TOE”) in CFTC Rule
32.3. Due to its physical settlement requirement (which is impossible for typical
binary options) and requirements regarding permitted option offerors and
offerees, it is very unlikely that the TOE would cover binary options. Thus, if
sports betting transactions are options, state law would appear to be preempted
56

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
A sports gambling business might also be a futures commission merchant
(“FCM”). An FCM is defined in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28). 7 U.S.C. § 6d requires FCMs to
register with the CFTC. FCMs are subject to extensive regulation under the U.S.C.
and CFTC rules. The CFTC has charged several “prediction market” and binary
options market operators over the years for failure to register as FCMs. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Charges
“Prediction Market” Proprietor Banc de Binary with Violating the CFTC’s OffExchange Options Trading Ban and Operating as an Unregistered Futures
Commission Merchant (June 6, 2013),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6602-13; Press Release,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Orders Principal of Binary
Options Trading Firm to Pay $200,000 for Illegal Off-Exchange Trading and
Registration Violations (July 29, 2019),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7985-19.
57
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by virtue of (1) CEA § 4c(b) and CFTC Rule 32.2 and/or (2) the fact that options
are generally swaps,58 the prohibition in CEA § 2(e) on non-ECPs entering into
swaps,59 and the fact that most members of the general public are not ECPs.60
C. Implied Preemption under the CEA
i.

Field Preemption

As discussed above, even if express preemption does not completely
displace state regulation, that does not end the inquiry under the Supreme Court’s
preemption jurisprudence because implied preemption may apply.61 Under the
implied preemption doctrine, a state gaming law that regulates swaps may be
preempted because Congress has occupied the field of swaps regulation through
the comprehensive CFTC swap oversight regime in Subtitle A (Regulation of
Over-the-Counter Swaps Markets) of Title VII of Dodd-Frank, which the CFTC
has implemented.62
ii. Conflict Preemption
Alternatively, state gaming law may present an implied conflict with the
CFTC’s swap regulatory regime because it could be viewed as an obstacle to
accomplishing congressional objectives in enacting Dodd-Frank. In other words,
any state law permitting sports bets with non-ECPs may be preempted by the
CEA when such sports bets constitute swaps, futures, or options because the
permissive state law would undermine the federal policy, embodied in, as
applicable, CEA §§ 2(a)(1)(A), 2(e), and 4c(b), as well as CFTC Rule 32.2
banning such transactions with non-ECPs other than on a DCM.
D. Court Cases Addressing Preemption under the CEA
Courts have addressed preemption in the context of the CEA more than
once with respect to futures, although not specifically in the context of sports
betting. In American Agriculture Movement, Inc v. Board of Trade of City of
Chicago, the court determined that “Congress intended to preempt some, but not
all, state laws that bear upon the various aspects of commodity futures
trading . . . [including] [w]hen application of state law would directly affect
58

See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(i).
See supra Section II.B.
60
Id.
61
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (explaining that
preemption may be either express or implied).
62
See supra Section IV.A discussing when field preemption may apply. See also
Barry Taylor-Brill, Cracking the Preemption Code: The New Model for OTC
Derivatives, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. at 11 (stating that Title VII of the Dodd-Frank
Act essentially occupied the field of swaps regulation, leaving the CFTC as its sole
occupant-in-charge).
59
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trading on or the operation of a futures market.”63 In a more recent ruling, the
court in Effex Capital, LLC v. National Futures Association noted that the CEA’s
structure “evinced a comprehensive regulatory scheme and that the legislative
history of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 suggested
that a catalyst for the significant amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act
was a fear that, without increased federal regulation, the states would regulate
the futures markets to a chaotic effect.”64
E. Legislative History of CEA 12(e)
The House Agriculture Committee explained the purpose and rationale
for CEA § 12(e)(1) in detail in a report related to the Futures Trading Act of
1982. Essentially, Congress felt that the CFTC could not adequately police offexchange commodities activities and addressed this concern by encouraging
states to be more “involved in actions against those who offer fraudulent offexchange investments and in policing transactions outside those preserved
exclusively for the jurisdiction of the CFTC.”65 Ultimately, Congress passed
CEA § 12(e)(1) understanding that it reflected the “Committee’s intention that
the resources of the CFTC and State officials should be used together to clean up
the continuing problem of off-exchange commodity frauds.”66
Given Congress’s clear intent that the CFTC and states should
concurrently exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter covered by CEA
§ 12(e)(1), it would be ironic for a court to apply CEA § 12(e)(1)—the “open
season” provision67—to shield market participants from the CEA. Therefore,
market participants should be cautioned against reading CEA § 12(e)(1) as an
opt out from the CFTC’s regulations by failing to trade on an exchange or obtain
CFTC registration or designation.

63

Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1155–56 (7th
Cir. 1992).
64
Effex Cap., LLC v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 933 F.3d 882, 894 (7th Cir. 2019).
65
H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 44 (1982).
66
Id. (emphasis added).
67
Id. (“[Then-CFTC] Chairman Philip Johnson characterized the provision as an
“open season” on such activities, and the Committee concurs.”).
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V. CFTC-REGULATED PRODUCTS THAT SPORTS BETS MAY
CONSTITUTE, POTENTIALLY LEADING TO FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS THAT PERMIT SPORTS
GAMBLING
A. Event Contracts
i.

Relevant CEA Provisions
CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i) provides:
In connection with the listing of agreements,
contracts, transactions, or swaps in excluded commodities that
are based upon the occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or
contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or
levels of a commodity described in section 1a(2)(i)) . . . by a
designated contract market or swap execution facility, the
Commission may determine that such agreements, contracts,
or transactions are contrary to the public interest if the
agreements, contracts, or transactions involve . . . gaming[.]

CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(ii) states that “[n]o agreement, contract, or
transaction determined by the Commission to be contrary to the public interest
under clause (i) may be listed or made available for clearing or trading on or
through a registered entity.”68
The reference to “1a(2)(i)” is nonsensical because neither CEA
§ 1a(2)(i) nor CEA § 1a(2) appear in the definition of “appropriate Federal
banking agency.” The authors believe that Congress instead meant to refer to
CEA § 1a(19)(i), a reading consistent with CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i)’s focus on
excluded commodities.69

68

7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(ii).
7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i) refers to excluded commodities “based upon the
occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the
price, rate, value, or levels of a commodity described in section 1a(2)(i))” (emphasis
added). 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19) defines the term “excluded commodity” as any one of the
items listed in four categories. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(i) is the first category and is
comprised of the following items: “an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security,
security index, credit risk or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure of
inflation, or other macroeconomic index or measure[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv) is the
fourth category and is comprised, in relevant part, of the following: “an occurrence,
extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value,
or level of a commodity not described in clause (i) [of 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)])” (emphasis
added).
69
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However, the excluded commodity definition in CEA § 1a(19)70 appears
to have its own interpretive difficulties that could significantly impact sports
betting event contracts. The excluded commodity definition’s clause (iv) states
that it covers occurrences “other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level
of a commodity not described in clause (i) [of the excluded commodity
definition]”71 (the “§ 1a(19) Carveout”). On its face, this double-negative
qualifier means that the scope of a clause (iv)-excluded commodity is limited to
the enumerated categories of changes in CEA § 1a(19)(A)(i) commodities alone.
In other words, if a commodity is not listed in clause (i), the occurrence, extent
of an occurrence, or contingency related to a change in its price, rate, value, or
level cannot be an excluded commodity under clause (iv). It would be odd if
changes in price, rate, value, or level constituted the universe of changes that
could occur with respect to clause (i) commodities given the following: (1) the
Commission’s focus in the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release on event
contracts outside the traditional futures contract underliers described in clause
(i); (2) Congress’s similar focus in CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C); and (3) the fact that the
only clause of the excluded commodity definition that such commodities would
seem to logically fall into is clause (iv).
An alternative interpretation of the § 1a(19) Carveout is that the word
“not” should be read out of it. Reading language out of a statute is disfavored in
statutory interpretation, but the CFTC has taken a similar approach at least once
before.72 Interpreting the word “not” in the § 1a(19) Carveout as a mistake would
Other than the “not” in § 1a(19)(iv), the italicized language from 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(19)(iv) and 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i) is almost identical. Because of that
similarity, the fact that the commodities listed in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(i) are
commodities that have traditionally underlay futures contracts, and that the 2008
Event Contract Concept Release was published just two years before Congress added
7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i) to the CEA, the authors believe that the reference in 7
U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i) to “[7 U.S.C. §] 1a(2)(i)” intended to refer to 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(19)(i). See also David E. Aron and Matthew Jones, The CFTC’s
Characterization of Virtual Currencies as Commodities: Implications under the
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP.
at 31, n.131 (May 2018) (stating that “the most logical interpretation is that the
reference was intended to be a reference to the first prong of the excluded commodity
definition (i.e., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(i)), thereby carving out of the ‘event contract’
definition contracts with events based on the excluded commodities listed in that
prong.”).
70
7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv) (clause (iv) of the excluded commodity definition in 7
U.S.C. § 1a(19) is an element of the gaming event contract prohibition in CFTC Rule
40.11(a)).
71
Id. (emphasis added).
72
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,258 (Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Swap Adopting Release] (characterizing
ambiguity in the CEA as a “scrivener’s error[,]” and interpreting changes to the
CEA contrary to one plain meaning because “[t]he CFTC believes that Congress
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mean that all types of occurrences, extent of occurrences, and contingencies of
all types would be excluded commodities under prong (iv) of the excluded
commodity definition, except for the set of occurrences, extent of occurrences,
and contingencies related to a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a prong
(i)-excluded commodity. This seems more consistent with congressional and
CFTC intent toward event contracts than the result discussed in the preceding
paragraph.
A third interpretation of the § 1a(19) Carveout is that it does not apply
to certain event contracts that Congress and the CFTC intended for CEA
§ 5c(c)(5)(C) and Rule 40.11(a) to capture. Under this interpretation, if an
occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency does not constitute a change
in price, rate, value, or level, it does not matter whether the commodity
experiencing the change is described in clauses (i)-(iv). Since that change would
not be a change in price, rate, value, or level, it would not be covered by the
carveout and could be an excluded commodity under prong (iv). Under this view,
two celebrities marrying does not seem on its face to be within the carveout
because such an occurrence does not seem to be a change in price, rate, value, or
level. Similarly, the occurrence of an athlete not playing in a game due to injury
would also not seem to be a price, rate, value, or level change and, therefore,
apparently could be an excluded commodity (and the type of event that Congress
may have not wanted people to profit from).
ii. Relevant CFTC Regulations
Based in part on the authority provided in CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i), on
July 19, 2011, the CFTC adopted final rules governing, among other things, the
listing and clearing of new contracts by registered entities,73 including Rule
40.11(a)(1), which states:
[A] registered entity shall not list for trading or accept
for clearing on or through the registered entity any of the
following: (1) An agreement, contract, transaction, or swap
based upon an excluded commodity, as defined in
Section 1a(19)(iv) of the Act, that involves, relates to, or
references terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity
that is unlawful under any State or Federal law[.]74
In the Registered Entities Adopting Release, the Commission stated that
it “ha[s] determined to prohibit contracts based upon activities enumerated in

did not intend the swap definition to overrule and effectively repeal another
provision of the CEA in such an oblique fashion.”).
73
See Provisions Common to Registered Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,799 (July 27,
2011) [hereinafter Registered Entities Adopting Release].
74
17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a)(1).

70

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

Section 745 of Dodd-Frank”75 and that “its prohibition of certain ‘gaming’
contracts is consistent with Congress’s intent to ‘prevent gambling through the
futures markets’ and to ‘protect the public interest from gaming . . . .’”76
Therefore, unless the CFTC withdraws Rule 40.11(a), neither a DCM nor a SEF
can list a sports betting contract that “involves, relates to, or
references . . . gaming[.]”
Instead of providing further clarification, the Commission noted that a
registered entity may receive a definitive resolution of any question concerning
the applicability of the prohibition in CFTC Rule 40.11(a)(1) on listing gaming
or other event contracts by submitting a particular product for approval.77
a. What is a “Financial, Commercial, or Economic Consequence” in
the Context of Rule 40.11(a)?
Rule 40.11(a) bans “[a]n agreement, contract, transaction, or swap based
upon an excluded commodity, as defined in [CEA §] . . . 1a(19)(iv)[,]” which is
the “excluded commodity” definition.78 In addition to the excluded commodity
definition’s clause (iv) parenthetical, one required element of that definition is
that the occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency in question is
“associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.” 79 This
requirement leads one to question whether sports bets have such consequences.
Because the language of prong (ii) of the swap definition (CEA § 1a(47)(A)(ii))

75

Registered Entities Adopting Release, supra note 73, at 44,785 (citing 156 Cong.
Rec. S5906 (July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Lincoln-Feinstein Colloquy] (Senator
Feinstein
responding
to
Senator
Lincoln),
https://www.congress.gov/111/crec/2010/07/15/CREC-2010-07-15-senate.pdf.
76
Id. at 44,786 (citing Lincoln-Feinstein Colloquy). Lincoln-Feinstein Colloquy
states the following at S5906-07:
[T]he Commission needs the power to, and should,
prevent derivatives contracts that are contrary to the public interest
because they exist predominantly to enable gambling through
supposed “event contracts.” It would be quite easy to construct an
“event contract” around sporting events such as the Super Bowl,
the Kentucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament.
See Registered Entities Adopting Release, supra note 73, at 44,785 (“The
Commission would like to note that registered entities may receive a definitive
resolution of any questions concerning the applicability of § 40.11(a)(1) by
submitting a particular product for Commission approval under § 40.3.”)
78
17 CFR § 40.11(a)(1).
79
7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv)(II).
77
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is so similar to the language of CEA § 1a(19)(iv),80 we discuss potential answers
to that question below in Section IV.B.1.
b. What is “Gaming in the Context of Rule 40.11(a)?
Several state statutes link the terms “gaming” or “gambling” to betting
on games. For example, an Illinois statute provides that “[a] person commits
gambling when he . . . makes a wager upon the result of any game, contest, or
any political nomination, appointment[,] or election . . . .”81 Gambling is
primarily a matter of state law, but there are federal gambling-related statutes as
well, such as the UIGEA.
As discussed above in Section II, under the UIGEA, it is unlawful for a
gambling business to accept payment for illegal Internet gambling.82 That statute
contains a definition of “bet or wager,” which means (with certain exclusions)
“the staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of
a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance, upon an
agreement or understanding that the person or another person will receive
something of value in the event of a certain outcome[.]”83 If an agreement,
contract, transaction, or swap based on CEA § 1a(19)(iv) involves, relates to, or
references “gaming,” it cannot currently be listed for trading by a DCM or SEF
(or cleared by a CFTC-registered DCO). “Gaming,” however, is not defined in
either the CEA or CFTC regulations.
c.

Prior CFTC Consideration and Analysis of Event Contracts and
“Gaming”
1. Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of
Event Contracts

In 2008, the CFTC issued the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release,
which discussed the CFTC’s jurisdiction over three main types of event
contracts, categorized as those based on (1) narrow commercial measures and
events; (2) certain environmental measures and events; and (3) general measures
and events.84 It also raised three general questions: (1) whether event contracts

Compare the relevant text of 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv) (“an occurrence, extent of an
occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of
a commodity not described in clause (i)) that is . . . (II) associated with a financial,
commercial, or economic consequence.”) to 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii) (“any purchase,
sale, payment, or delivery . . . dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the
extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential
financial, economic, or commercial consequence.”).
81
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/28-1 (West 2019).
82
31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
83
31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2006).
84
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671.
80
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are within the CFTC’s jurisdiction; (2) if CFTC jurisdictional, should
exemptions or exclusions apply; and (3) how should the CFTC address the
potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the possible preemption of
state gaming laws?85
The CFTC also stated that “[a] significant number of event contracts are
structured as all-or-nothing binary transactions commonly described as binary
options,”86 and that event contracts “have been based on a wide variety of
interests including the results of presidential elections, the accomplishment of
certain scientific advances, world population levels, the adoption of particular
pieces of legislation, the outcome of corporate product sales, the declaration of
war and the length of celebrity marriages.”87
The Commission further suggested, for purposes of its discussion, that
event contracts could be categorized based on: (1) narrow commercial measures
and events; (2) certain environmental measures and events; or (3) general
measures and events.88
The Commission explained that some event contracts reflected narrow
commercial measures or events and explained those concepts:
Narrow commercial measures quantify and reflect the
rate, value, or level of particularized commercial activity, such
as a specific farmer’s crop yield. Narrow commercial events,
on the other hand, are events that might, in and of themselves,
have commercial implications, such as changes in corporate
officers or corporate asset purchases.89
These narrow commercial events appear related to a specific entity’s
interests, which could be analogous to sports-related events, such as a team’s
performance or a specific athlete’s on-field achievements (for example, scoring
a touchdown). While some may find it odd to view the outcome of a sporting
event as having commercial implications, others seem to disagree. 90

85

Id. at 25,670.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 25,671.
89
Id.
90
See Public Statement, CFTC, Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz on
ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts and Certain Event Contracts (Mar. 25, 2021)
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiujffPwujxAhXNMVkFHQThAxMQFnoECAcQAA&url
=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cftc.gov%2FPressRoom%2FSpeechesTestimony%2Fqui
ntenzstatement032521&usg=AOvVaw1fR1tqeGgI2n0ahCOdN0Uh
[hereinafter
Quintenz ErisX Statement] (explaining that “[s]ince practically any event has at least
a minimal financial, commercial, or economic consequence, all events are
commodities.”) (emphasis added).
86
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In contrast, the Commission explained that “general measures and
events” include political and entertainment measures and events that do not
quantify the rate, value, or level of any commercial or environmental activity. 91
In making this observation, the Commission stated that these general measures
and events do not “reflect” a commercial or environmental event, and noted that,
consequently, futures contracts on such general measures and events are
ineligible to be listed on DCMs, because they do not satisfy the economic
purpose test under former CEA § 5(g).92
The Commission also noted that, unlike the interests that event contracts
cover, the interests that other futures contracts cover “have been viewed by
Commission staff as having generally-accepted and predictable financial,
commercial or economic consequences.”93 That is to say the Commission
distinguished event contracts from other futures contracts that cover “measures
and occurrences that reasonably could be expected to correlate to market prices
or other broad-based commercial or economic measures or activities.”94
Today’s Commission could also take the view that event contracts do
not have “generally-accepted and predictable financial, commercial or economic
consequences,” and interpret that to mean that the payout trigger on a sports bet
(i.e., the relevant occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency mentioned
in CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)) is not associated with the financial, commercial, or
economic consequence required by § 5c(c)(5)(C). That would mean that sports
bets would not be event contracts, making them ineligible to be banned under
Rule 40.11(a) from being listed or cleared by a registered entity. However, not
everyone agrees that general event contracts are not associated with a financial,
commercial, or economic consequence.95
In the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, the Commission solicited
comment on “What calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be
appropriate in determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency

91

2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671.
Id. at 25,672 (“Accordingly, while futures contracts that failed the economic
purpose test were prohibited from trading on futures exchanges and thus illegal
because of the on-exchange trading requirement [set forth in CEA § 4(a)], they (and
any instrument with identical terms) remained futures contracts, fully subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction.”). The economic purpose test is derived from an
unadopted version of former CEA § 5(g). Congress instead adopted the Senate’s
broader version of § 5(g) that included a “public interest” standard.
93
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671.
94
Id.
95
See Statement, Bart Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n,
Dissent from Approval of Media Derivatives Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion
Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option Contracts (June 14, 2010),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdo
cs/mdexdissentingchilton061410.pdf (illustrating that the “commodity” definition is
too expansive by providing the example that whether a certain movie star dies or
becomes disabled “could have economic consequences . . . .”).
92
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will result in a financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified
in [the excluded commodity definition in ] [CEA] Section 1a[.]” That issue still
resonates today.96
2. Media Derivatives’ Movie Box Office Contracts
In regard to the same event contracts discussed in the 2008 Event
Contract Concept Release, the CFTC’s statement on Media Derivatives, Inc.’s
movie box office contracts (the “MDEX Statement”) appears to have raised
congressional concerns.97 The statement caused some to think that the
Commission would permit gambling, which potentially led Congress to
expressly grant the CFTC the authority (in the form of CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)) to
prohibit event contracts if the Commission determined such contracts to be
contrary to public interest.98
In the MDEX Statement, the Commission determined that box office
revenue was a commodity, noting that under the Commission’s DCM contract
listing review process, a contract would be approved if it was based on a
commodity and not readily susceptible to manipulation.99 However, thenCommissioner Chilton disagreed and argued that the Commission should have
denied the box office revenue futures contract on public interest grounds or else
the Commission could “approve terrorism contracts or contracts on whether a
certain movie star will die . . . .”100 Congress apparently agreed with
Commissioner Chilton101 and passed Dodd-Frank § 721(a)(4), thereby amending
the “commodity” definition in CEA § 1a(9) to expressly exclude motion picture
box office receipts, joining onions as the only things expressly excluded from

96

2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,673.
See generally Statement, Comm’n, Commodities Future Trade Comm’n,
Statement of the Commission approving MDEX (June 14, 2010),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissi
onstatement061410.pdf.
98
See Shaun Raviv, Box Office Bomb: The Short Life of Popcorn Prediction
Markets,
THE
RINGER
(Nov.
15,
2018,
6:30
AM),
https://www.theringer.com/movies/2018/11/15/18091620/box-office-futures-doddfrank-mpaa-recession.
99
See generally Statement, Comm’n, Commodities Future Trade Comm’n,
Statement of the Commission approving MDEX 2 (June 14, 2010),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissi
onstatement061410.pdf.
100
Chilton, supra note 95, at 2.
101
Raviv, supra note 98, at 11–15 (reporting that the Movie Pictures Association of
America stated the movie box office revenue contracts would only serve people who
wanted to gamble and that Representative Kurt Schrader of Oregon equated movie
box office revenue contracts to gambling).
97
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the commodity definition.102 Congress also added CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C),
empowering the CFTC to deny, on public interest grounds, the types of contracts
Commissioner Chilton disapproved.
3. NADEX Political Event Contracts
The CTFC analyzed whether political event derivative contracts
(“political event contracts” or “PECs”) that NADEX (a DCM) sought to list for
trading were consistent with CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C) and Commission Regulation
40.11(a)(1), and issued an order prohibiting NADEX from listing its PECs
because they were deemed contrary to the public interest.103 The Commission
found that a PEC enabling “betting” on elections is forbidden under various state
laws and that several state gambling definitions for “bet” and “wager”
specifically include political events, which constituted “gaming” contracts. 104
The Commission further cited the definition of “bet or wager” from the UIGEA,
which defines the term as “the staking or risking by any person of something of
value upon the outcome of a contest of others,” for the proposition that:
[T]aking a position in a [PEC] fits the plain meaning
of a person staking “something of value upon a contest of
others,” as the [PECs] are all premised either directly (in the
case of the presidential [PECs]) or indirectly (in the cases of
the House and Senate majority control [PECs]) on the outcome
of a contest between electoral candidates[.]105
Accordingly, the CFTC found that NADEX’s PECs involve gaming
within the meaning of CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i)(V) and Commission Regulation
40.11(a)(1). Further, the Commission found that the PECs “could not reasonably

102

Relatedly, Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1672, amended 7 U.S.C.
§ 13-1(a) to prohibit box office receipts (“or any index, measure, value, or data
related to such receipts”) futures contracts from being traded on or subject to the
rules of any board of trade in the United States. Onion futures were already subject
to this prohibition.
103
See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, Order Prohibiting the
Listing or Trading of Political Event Contracts, COMMODITIES FUTURE TRADING
COMM’N
(Apr.
2,
2012),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/d
ocuments/ifdocs/nadexorder040212.pdf (2012 The self-certified contracts included:
a Democratic Majority in the U.S. House of Representatives Binary Contract; a
Republican Majority in the U.S. House of Representatives Binary Contract; a
Democratic Majority in the U.S. Senate Binary Contract; a Republican Majority in
the U.S. Senate Binary Contract; and ten U.S. Presidency Binary Contracts.
104
Id. at 2–3.
105
Id. at 3 (internal citation omitted).

76

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

be expected to be used for hedging purposes[,]”106 but could be used to adversely
affect election outcomes and were contrary to the public interest as contemplated
by CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C).107 Based on these findings, the CFTC ordered NADEX
not to list or trade the PECs.108
4. ErisX NFL Event Contracts
Another DCM, Eris Exchange, LLC (“ErisX”), has tested the Rule
40.11(a) waters with the CFTC more recently, self-certifying three futures
contracts related to National Football League games (the “Football Futures”): a
moneyline contract (based on the outright winner of a football game), a point
spread contract, and an over/under contract.109 ErisX’s attempted selfcertification prompted one commissioner to issue a statement supporting some
pathway to list gaming contracts.110 ErisX contended that its Football Futures
“do not constitute ‘gaming[,]’” and do not allow market participants to gamble,
explaining that it designed the Football Futures “specifically to meet the hedging
needs of commercial market participants.”111 ErisX sought to distinguish its
Football Futures as outside the application of CFTC Rule 40.11(a)’s authority to
prohibit gaming event contracts by focusing on the Registered Entities Adopting
Release’s observation that Rule 40.11(a) is consistent with Congress’s intent to

106

Id.
Id. at 4.
108
Id.
109
See Press Release, Commodities Future Trading Comm’n, CFTC Announces
Review of RSBIX NFL Futures Contracts Proposed by Eris Exchange, LLC (Dec.
23, 2020), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8345-20.
110
See Public Statement, Brian D. Quintenz, Comm’r, Commodities Future Trading
Comm’n, Statement on ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts and Certain Event Contracts:
Any Given Sunday in the Futures Market (Mar, 25, 2021),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiujffPwujxAhXNMVkFHQThAxMQFnoECAcQAA&url
=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cftc.gov%2FPressRoom%2FSpeechesTestimony%2Fqui
ntenzstatement032521&usg=AOvVaw1fR1tqeGgI2n0ahCOdN0Uh
[hereinafter
Quintenz ErisX Statement] (stating “I don’t opine today whether the ErisX NFL
contracts should ultimately be allowed or prohibited because I don’t believe the
Commission currently has a constitutional or valid process to evaluate them. The
issues here are bigger than ErisX’s contracts; the statute is unconstitutional, the
regulation is invalid, and even without those issues, there were flaws in the Order
that made it arbitrary and capricious”).
111
See Letter from ErisX to Commodities Future Trading Comm’n, CFTC Rule
40.2(a) Certification[] Notification Regarding the Initial Listing of Eris Exchange
RSBIX NFL Futures (Eris Exchange Submission #2020-11E) 1, 7 (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.erisx.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ErisX-Draft-Self-CertificationRSBIX-Sports-Futures-Dec-14-2020.pdf.
107
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prevent gambling through the futures markets.112 Rather than simply allowing
the Football Futures to trade pursuant to the self-certification, the CFTC did the
following: (1) notified ErisX on December 23, 2020 that it was commencing a
ninety-day review of the Football Futures;113 (2) requested “that ErisX suspend
any listing and trading of its proposed [Football Futures] during the . . . [ninety]day review period”;114 and (3) requested public comment on several questions
related to the ErisX Football Contracts, the first of which was, “Do any of these
contracts involve, relate to, or reference gaming as described in Commission
regulation 40.11(a)(1)?”115
Before the Commission could issue an order116 presumably denying117
these contracts, ErisX withdrew the certification. Thus, the order was never made
public (“Unissued ErisX Order”). However, Commissioner Quintenz felt
“compelled to release [a] statement to bring transparency to [the] debate and
process” behind this proposed order and, accordingly, provided a summary of
his reasoning.118 The Quintenz ErisX Statement discussed the proposed order
and the Commissioner’s objections to the order’s analysis.119 The Commissioner
raised constitutional concerns with CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i) and Administrative
See id. at 7 (citing “Congress’s intent to ‘prevent gambling through the futures
markets’” and “‘to protect the public interest from gaming and other event[]
contracts’” and a colloquy between Senators Lincoln and Feinstein “emphasiz[ing]
that the Commission ‘needs the power to, and should, prevent derivatives . . . that
are contrary to the public interest because they exist predominantly to enable
gambling through . . . event contracts’”).
113
See Letter from Commodities Future Trading Comm’n to ErisX, Notification of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or Commission)
Commencement of 90-Day Review of Proposed Football Futures (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/documents/2020/orgdcmerissignedle
tter201223.pdf.
114
Id.
115
See Questions on the Eris Exchange, LLC (“ErisX”) RSBIX NFL Futures
Contracts
for
Public
Comment,
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/documents/2020/orgdcmerisquestion
sre201223.pdf.
116
17 CFR § 40.11 (2021) (requiring the Commission to issue an order approving
or disapproving a contract subject to a ninety-day review under § 40.11(c)).
117
See Quintenz, supra note 110 (revealing that “Commission staff proposed an
Order that found the ErisX NFL contracts involved gaming, were prohibited by
regulation, and were also contrary to the public interest. This proposed Order . . . was
circulated to the Commission for a vote . . . .” Notably, “[j]ust hours before this
voting process could conclude, and likely in anticipation of the Order’s approval by
the Commission, ErisX decided to withdraw their certification, preventing the Order
from being . . . considered by the Commission . . . .”).
118
Id.
119
See Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts
and Certain Event Contracts: Any Given Sunday in the Futures Market, supra note
110.
112
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Procedure Act concerns with Commission Rule 40.11(a), and considered the
proposed order arbitrary in its determination.120
It is unclear whether Commissioner Quintenz supports listing gaming
contracts, because his statement focused on broader issues. The Quintenz ErisX
Statement also provided a partial summary of the Unissued ErisX Order.
Commissioner Quintenz explained, according to the Unissued ErisX Order, the
term “gaming” includes gambling and sports wagering, and “(1) the ‘record in
this matter does not establish that the ErisX NFL event contracts have a hedging
utility’”121 and (2) the contracts are “contrary to the public interest because they
‘could potentially promote sports gambling through the derivatives markets.’”122
Commissioner Berkovitz provided a statement summarizing his legal
basis for supporting the Unissued ErisX Order, as well as his views on the
“gaming” definition and the CFTC’s approach to the public interest test. He
wrote that “a contract that is structured identically to gaming contracts, labelled
with the same terms as gaming contracts, and designed with a purpose to hedge

120

Id.
Id. Another objection Commissioner Quintenz voiced regarding the Unissued
ErisX Order was that “[t]he Order used legislative history to reinstitute the economic
purpose test that the Commission used to determine whether a contract was contrary
to public interest prior to that test’s removal from the CEA by the CFMA[]”) (internal
quotation marks removed). But see Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz
related to Review of ErisX Certification of NFL Future Contracts, COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N
(Apr.
7,
2021),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement040721at
n.17 (stating that in the Commission’s 2012 NADEX Order, which prohibited the
listing or trading of political event contracts, the Commission determined that:
121

[T]he legislative history of CEA Section 5c(C)(5)(C)
indicates Congress’s intent to restore, for the purposes of that
provision, the economic purpose test that was used by the
Commission to determine whether a contract was contrary to the
public interest pursuant to CEA Section 5(g) prior to its deletion
by the [CFMA].
Commissioner Berkovitz appears to have been referencing the language in the
NADEX Order stating that PECs “could not reasonably be expected to be used for
hedging purposes.” In the Matter of the Self-Certification by North American
Derivatives Exchange, Inc., of Political Event Derivatives Contracts and Related
Rule Amendments under Part 40 of the Regulations of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Order Prohibiting the Listing or Trading of Political Event
Contracts, supra note 103, at 3. See supra Section V.A.ii.c.iii.
122
Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz on ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts
and Certain Event Contracts: Any Given Sunday in the Futures Market, supra note
110.
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gaming contracts ‘involves’ gaming.”123 Commissioner Berkovitz also stated
that, “[b]ecause in many states sports betting is now legal . . . , it would not be
‘contrary to the public interest’ for the Commission to permit the listing of sports
event contracts . . . used to hedge commercial risks . . .” arising from legal, sports
betting-related commerce.124 Thus, Commissioner Berkovitz appears to support
some revisions to Commission Rule 40.11(a).125
B. Swaps
An agreement, contract, or transaction is a swap if it falls within any one
of the six categories of the “swap” definition in CEA § 1a(47)(A), unless the
agreement, contract, or transaction is excluded from the definition by CEA
§ 1a(47)(B) or has been interpreted or defined by the CFTC as not being a
swap.126 Although sports bets could be analyzed under any of the prongs of the
swap definition (only one of which needs to be satisfied for an agreement,
contract, or transaction to be a swap), we focus on two of those prongs here: the
“event prong” and the “options prong.”
i.

Event Prong

CEA § 1a(49)(A)(ii) defines as a swap any agreement, contract, or
transaction “that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery (other than
a dividend on an equity security) that is dependent on the occurrence,
nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency
associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence[.]”
This language is similar to that of CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(i), which grants the CFTC

123

Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz related to Review of ErisX
Certification of NFL Future Contracts, supra note 121. Given that an event contract
must only involve, relate to, or reference gaming to be prohibited under CFTC Rule
40.11(a), such contract can easily run afoul of Rule 40.11(a), even if it does not itself
constitute gaming.
124
Id.
125
Id. (“The Commission should permit a DCM to list contracts involving sports
events where a DCM demonstrates that such contracts have an economic purpose
and hedging utility related to such commercial activity”).
126
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2019). See also Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1), (4)
(respectively, require that: “the [CFTC] and the [SEC] . . . shall further define the
term[] ‘swap’”; and
Any interpretation of, or guidance by either Commission
regarding, a provision of this title, shall be effective only if issued
jointly by the [CFTC] and the [SEC], after consultation with the
Board of Governors, if this title requires the [CFTC] and the
[SEC] to issue joint regulations to implement the provision).
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authority to prohibit specified event contracts from being listed or cleared by a
registered entity.
More specifically, the first part of this prong (i.e., a payment dependent
on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event)
would seem to clearly encompass sports betting of all kinds. The second part of
this prong (a potential financial, commercial, or economic consequence) may or
may not also be met. Commissioner Quintenz, for example, has opined that
“practically any event has at least a minimal financial, commercial, or economic
consequence.”127 Former Commissioner Chilton has said that whether a certain
movie star dies or becomes disabled “could have economic consequences[.]” 128
By contrast, in the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, the
Commission compared event contracts unfavorably (as to the existence of a
financial, commercial, or economic consequence) to even DCM-listed futures
and options with payout terms based on interests other than price-based
interests. According to the Commission, “[w]hile not strictly price-based, the
interests underlying [the latter] have been viewed by Commission staff as having
generally accepted and predictable financial, commercial or economic
consequences . . . unlike the interests that event contracts cover.”129
If the current Commission agrees with the 2008 Commission in thinking
event contracts have generally accepted and predictable financial, commercial,
or economic consequences, and conclude that such tenuous consequences do not
satisfy the second part of the event prong, then sports betting event contracts
would not be swaps under the event prong. Even if some sport gaming contracts
do not meet the “event prong” definition, they may still be swaps under one of
the other prongs of the “swap” definition.

127

Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz on ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts
and Certain Event Contracts: Any Given Sunday in the Futures Market, supra note
110.
128
Chilton, supra note 95 at 2.
129
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671 (emphasis
added).
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Binary and Other Options

The CFTC130 and various courts131 have held that binary options are
options, or otherwise treated them as such. CEA § 1a(49)(A)(i) defines a swap
as an agreement, contract, or transaction:
[T]hat is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option
of any kind that is for the purchase or sale, or based on the
value, of 1 or more interest or other rates, currencies,
commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices,
quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests
or property of any kind[.]
a. CFTC v. Trade Exchange Network Ltd.
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the court in CFTC v. Trade Exchange Network Ltd.
found that event contracts were binary options for purposes of CEA § 4c(b).132
The court explained:
The contracts offered on www.intrade.com meet the
characteristics of what are known to the trade as “binary
options.” Binary options are options with discontinuous
payoffs. A simple example of a binary option is a cash-ornothing call. This pays off nothing if the asset price ends up
below the strike price at time T and pays a fixed amount, Q, if
it ends up above the strike price. . . . A cash-or-nothing put is
defined analogously to a cash-or-nothing call. It pays off Q if

130

See Trade Exchange Network, CFTC No. 05-14, 1, (Sept. 29, 2005)
(“The . . . [CFTC] has reason to believe that the Trade Exchange Network [] has
violated Section 4c(b) of the [CEA] . . . .”). The CFTC argued that Intrade continued
to offer and execute binary options trades by U.S.-based customers, such as
predictions about future acts of war “(e.g., ‘U.S. to conduct overt military action
against North Korea before midnight ET on 31 Dec 2011’).” Complaint at 8, CFTC
v. Trade Exchange Network Ltd., 2012 WL 5897587 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2012). Binary
options are legally offered at a limited number of DCMs in the United States and
seem to be rife with fraud. See, e.g., CFTC/SEC Investor Alert: Binary Options and
Fraud,
https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/fraudadv_binaryopti
ons.html).
131
See CFTC v. Harrison Kantor et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-02247-SJF-ARL at 12
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2019) (concluding that defendants’ binary options violated a CEA
provision and a related CFTC regulation related to commodity options); CFTC v.
Vision Fin. Partners, LLC, 190 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1130 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (holding that
binary options are commodity options within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. § 4c(b)).
132
CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 F. Supp. 3d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2015).
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the asset price is below the strike price and nothing if it is
above the strike price.133
The court also noted that these event contracts are known as options in industry
practice and resemble some NADEX binary options for economic events.134
The court did not have the opportunity to address sport event contracts
specifically because Trade Exchange Network Ltd. (“TEN”) had stopped
offering them to U.S. customers.135 Nevertheless, the court’s analysis appears to
support the Commission’s view in its prior 2005 consent agreement claiming that
TEN violated CEA § 4c(b) in relation to the sale of event options, presumably
including the applicable sport event options traded on TEN’s websites. 136 The
court’s reasoning may also support treating sports bets as binary options that fall
into the options prong of the “swap” definition.137 Following the TEN-Intrade
settlement, the CFTC brought and settled a number of cases involving binary
options trading.138
133

Id. at 35–36.
Being known to the trade as an option is an element of the option definition in 7
U.S.C. § 1a(36). Being known to the trade as a swap is an element of prong (iv) of
the swap definition in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(iv). Given that various options are swaps
under the definition in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(i), being known in industry practice as
options may also meet the swap definition under prong (vi). See 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(47)(A)(vi) (“any combination or permutation of, or option on, any agreement,
contract, or transaction described in any of clauses (i) through (v) [of the CEA’s swap
definition]”).
135
See CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 F. Supp. 3d. at 38 (stating “on or
about February 28, 2007, TEN deconsolidated into three separate entities in order
to ‘separate TEN’s non-sports prediction markets from its sports markets’ and TEN
‘transferred its non-sports prediction markets and technology-related intellectual
property to Intrade.’” (internal citation omitted)). See also Daniel Oboyle, Sports
Exchange Tradesports to Return to US Market, IGB NORTH AMERICA (Dec. 5,
2019), https://www.igbnorthamerica.com/sports-exchange-tradesports-to-return-tous-market/ (stating that the original Tradesports closed in 2008, and “relaunched as
a fantasy exchange product, which was [designed to be] legal in the US.”).
136
CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 F. Supp. 3d. at 38 (stating that the
“contracts (including 420 contracts concerning the hurricane season and 491
contracts about New York City snowfall) and 2,444 contracts regarding U.S.
economic numbers are commodity options under the Act”).
137
TEN owned and operated internet-based trading platforms, including
Tradesports, which offered typical sports contracts such as an over under on the
NCAA Final Four Michigan State versus North Carolina. See TRADESPORTS (Apr. 1,
2005), http://tradesports.com
[https://web.archive.org/web/20050401083417/http://www.tradesports.com/].
138
See, e.g., Settlement order, In re Glenn Olson, CFTC Docket No. 21-05 (Apr. 6,
2021); Complaint, CFTC v. Davis, Case No. 3:19-cv-2140 (N.D. Ohio, W. Div.)
(Sept. 17, 2019) (alleging the defendant fraudulently solicited and accepted payment
134
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b. Sports Bets
Numerous sports bets can be characterized as options, often as binary
options with two possible payouts depending on the outcome.139 For example, a
bet on whether a team will win and a bet on whether a team will win by a certain
number of points each have two possible outcomes. Other sports bets may be
structured to have more than two possible payout amounts, such as (1) a fixed or
variable payout if a bet is in the money, no payout if it is out of the money other
than as a result of a tie game, and a return of the amount bet in the event of a tie;
or (2) a variable payout that increases with an increase in the number of yards a
running back gains in a football game, as an example.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a sports bet may not be a swap under
prong (i) of the swap definition, which requires that the agreement, contract, or
transaction in question be “for the purchase or sale, or based on the value, of”
the underlier.140 Because a sports bet on the outcome of a game, a point spread,
or an over/under is not “for the purchase or sale of” the game outcome (such as
putting aside misconduct such as point shaving or throwing the game), a sports
bet seems unlikely to be a swap based on the plain language in CEA
§ 1a(47)(A)(i) noting an option “for the purchase or sale of” an item listed under
that prong.
Thus, to fall within the option prong, a sports bet would need to be “a
put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind that is . . . based on the
value of” one of the items listed in the prong (e.g., a rate, commodity, index,
quantitative measure, or other financial or economic interest of any kind).141 If
from customers to trade off-exchange binary options); Settlement Order, Curtis
Dalton, CFTC Docket No. 19-17 (July 19, 2019) (settlement order); Press Release,
CFTC, CFTC Filed Enforcement Actions Against Two Affiliate Marketers for
Binary Options Fraud, Release No. 8047-19 (Oct. 7, 2019) (a pair of enforcement
actions); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Multiple Forex and Binary Options
Dealers with Registration Violations, Release No. 7785-18 (Sept. 14, 2018) (settling
charges against eight unregistered entities and eight unregistered individuals).
139
Although we have focused on binary options, which are common in sports
betting, other options may also fall within the option prong of the “swap” definition
under 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(i), including options with more than two outcomes, such
as a bet that has a “push” as a third option. An option is defined broadly in 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(36) as “an agreement, contract, or transaction that is of the character of, or is
commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’, ‘privilege’, ‘indemnity’, ‘bid’, ‘offer’,
‘put’, ‘call’, ‘advance guaranty’, or ‘decline guaranty[.]’” See also the definition of
“Commodity option transaction; commodity option” in CFTC Rule 1.3(hh), the core
of which is substantively the same as the 7 U.S.C § 1a(36) “option” definition, but
elements of which on their face, at least, are both broader (i.e., the “or is held out to
be” language) and narrower (i.e., the “in interstate commerce” and “and which is
subject to regulation under . . . [CFTC regulations]” qualifying language).
140
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(i).
141
Id.
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the word “value” in the option prong means “monetary worth” for purposes of
the swap definition’s option prong142–as opposed to a numerical quantity that is
assigned or is determined by calculation or measurement–143 a sports bet posing
a “yes” or “no” answer is arguably not based on a value, with the result that such
sports bet may not be a swap under CEA § 1a(47)(A)(i).144
Even if sports bets are not swaps under prong (i) of the swap definition,
they may be swaps under prong (vi), which defines a swap as “any combination
or permutation of, or option on, any agreement, contract, or transaction described
in any of clauses (i) through (v).”145 For example, even if a binary option
triggered by the Cubs winning the 2022 World Series would not be a swap under
prong (i), its binary option nature may be viewed as a permutation of an option
that is a swap under prongs (i) and (vi), rendering the Cubs World Series bet a
swap.
C. Options: CEA § 4c(b)
CFTC Rule 32.2 makes it unlawful to engage in any interstate commerce
transaction that is a commodity option transaction unless it is conducted in
compliance with CEA provisions and all applicable CFTC authority, otherwise
142

See,
e.g.,
Value,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/value (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
143
Id.
144
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC’s regulation of binary options was based
on the off-exchange options ban in Regulation 32.1. That regulation was repealed
after the enactment of Dodd-Frank on the premise that all commodity options,
including binary options, are swaps and, per CFTC Rule 32.2, are now subject to the
same regulations as swaps, unless they satisfy the terms of the TOE in Rule 32.3
(which requires physical settlement of the option and that the offeree be a commercial
market participant, making the TOE inapplicable to typical sports bets). Rule 32.2
states:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons
to offer to enter into, enter into, confirm the execution of, maintain
a position in, or otherwise conduct activity related to any
transaction in interstate commerce that is a commodity option
transaction, unless:
(a) Such transaction is conducted in compliance with and subject
to the provisions of the Act, including any Commission rule,
regulation, or order thereunder, otherwise applicable to any other
swap; or
(b) [complies with the trade option exemption].
See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based
Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Swap Adopting Release, supra note 72, at 48,236
(stating that “commodity options are swaps under the statutory swaps definition”).
145
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(vi).
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applicable to any swap, subject to the TOE, which likely is inapplicable to typical
sports bets.146 Thus, if the CFTC considered sports bets to be options, the
Commission could potentially use its CEA § 4c(b) plenary options authority to
amend Rule 32.2 to allow sports gambling to exist legally under the CEA.147
D. CEA § 2(c)(2)(D)
Even if a sports bet is not treated as a swap or futures contract, CEA
§ 2(c)(2)(D)(i) and (iii) still may make it unlawful to enter, or offer to enter, into
a sports bet off a permitted exchange with a non-ECP if the sports bet is a
leveraged or margined transaction or is financed by, or on behalf of, the offeror
or counterparty.148 Although this provision has not been applied to gambling in
an enforcement action, it is possible that the bet versus potential winnings could
be viewed as leverage or margin within the meaning of CEA § 2(c)(2)(D).
If the bet wins, the bettor receives the winnings, plus their initial stake
back. The bet could be viewed as leveraged within the meaning of CEA
§ 2(c)(2)(D) in that the bet may control a much larger position, particularly if
there are long odds. For example, if the odds are 20-1 and the bettor must put up
only $5 to win $100, it resembles the amount of leverage in a futures contract.149
Structurally, a bet looks like an automatically exercised option with the premium
(here, the bet) fully paid. The only distinction, however, is that the bet is returned
to the winning bettor, whereas option sellers typically keep option premiums,
regardless of whether the option is exercised.
There is an exception to the general prohibition in CEA § 2(c)(2)(D)(i)
for transactions in which the commodity in question is “actually delivered”
within twenty-eight days of the transaction.150 Although the concept of actual
delivery has been applied to intangibles, such as cryptocurrency,151 it seems
146

The TOE is likely inapplicable because (1) most bettors are unlikely to be ECPs
and (2) sports bets are cash settled, not physically settled. See 17 C.F.R. § 32.3(a)(1)
and (3), respectively.
147
This could take many forms, including sports betting possibly being subject to
state sports betting regulatory schemes, based on the “under such terms and
conditions as the Commission shall prescribe” language in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b).
148
7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D)(i) and (iii).
149
See e.g., CME Group Inc., Introduction to Futures Margin: Know What’s
Needed, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegroup.com/education/courses/introductionto-futures/margin-know-what-is-needed.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (“Futures
margin generally represents a smaller percentage of the notional value of the contract,
typically 3–12% per futures contract as opposed to up to 50% of the face value of
securities purchased on margin.”).
150
See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa) (2019) (“This
subparagraph shall not apply to a contract of sale that—(aa) results in actual delivery
within 28 days or such other longer period as the Commission may determine by rule
or regulation based upon the typical commercial practice in cash or spot markets for
the commodity involved”).
151
See 85 Fed. Reg. 37,737 (June 24, 2020).
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unlikely that the CFTC would stretch the concept further by applying it to the
cash settlement of a bet.

VI.

POTENTIAL CFTC APPROACHES TO SPORTS BETTING

If the CFTC concluded that prohibiting sports betting is neither required
nor warranted under the CEA, there are several ways it can permit sports betting,
including amending its rules or providing interpretive guidance, exemptions, and
no-action relief.152 In the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release–before DoddFrank explicitly empowered the CFTC to prohibit gaming event contracts on
DCMs and SEFs–the Commission sought comment on whether, “[i]f event
contracts are within the Commission’s jurisdiction, should there be exemptions
or exclusions applied to them . . . .”153 Although the CFTC did not address sports
gaming specifically in the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, it did say that
“[e]vent contracts have been based on a wide variety of interests,” and asked how
it should “address the potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the
possible pre-emption of state gaming laws.”154 Thus, permitting sports betting in
some form does not seem out of the question for the CFTC.
A. Maintain the Status Quo
The Commission could decide to maintain the status quo given the Rule
40.11(a) restrictions on registered entities listing and clearing gaming event
contracts, ErisX’s unsuccessful attempt to list Football Futures, and the
uncertainty surrounding sports bets wagered other than on a DCM. This seems
unlikely over the long term based on Commissioner Berkovitz’s openness to
gaming event contracts under the right circumstances155 and Commissioner
Quintenz’s views on the flaws of Rule 40.11(a) and its statutory
underpinnings.156
B. Regulate Sports Betting
The CFTC may permit sports swaps and/or event contract markets by
revising its regulations to permit sports betting either under its oversight or even
under state law, with states that have legalized sports betting. Commissioner
Berkovitz noted that the sports betting landscape is dramatically different from

152

The CFTC could also issue a policy statement, which it has several times in the
past. See, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 45,291 (July 26, 2013) (cross-border application of CEA
swap provisions); Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,694 (July 21, 1989).
153
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25, 670.
154
Id.
155
Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz related to Review of ErisX
Certification of NFL Future Contracts, supra note 121, at 5.
156
See generally Quintenz ErisX Statement, supra note 110, at 10.
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when the Commission promulgated Regulation 40.11.157 He also suggested that
it “would not be ‘contrary to the public interest’ for the Commission to permit
the listing of sports event contracts if an exchange can demonstrate that the
contracts will be used to hedge commercial risks arising from lawful commercial
activity related to sports betting.”158
The CFTC could decide to permit sports bets in a few ways beyond
swaps between ECP counterparties. For example, the CFTC may determine that
the underlier for a sports swap does not meet the commercial consequence
requirement for purposes of the excluded commodity definition.159 If the
underlying commodity (e.g., an underlying sporting event-related occurrence) is
not an excluded commodity, then CEA § 5c(c)(5)(C)(ii) and Rule 40.11(a) would
not apply, resulting in no restriction on DCMs listing (and DCOs clearing)
futures sports bets. In that regard, it is plausible that the CFTC may determine
that there is no commercial consequence associated with a variety of sports bets,
including popular Super Bowl prop bets such as who wins the coin toss.
Arguably, some sports outcomes have no direct, predictable, or
meaningful financial, economic, or commercial consequences, particularly when
compared to a bet on a decrease in GDP or an increase in unemployment, as
examples. In the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, the Commission
suggested that “general events, such as whether a [c]onstitutional amendment
will be adopted or whether two celebrities will decide to marry, can be described
as events that do not reflect the occurrence of any commercial or environmental
event.”160 The Commission contrasted these event contracts with others that
“have been viewed as measures and occurrences that reasonably could be
expected to correlate to market prices or other broad-based commercial or
economic measures or activities.”161 The Commission also requested comment
157

See Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz related to Review of ErisX
Certification of NFL Future Contracts, supra note 121, at 3 (“in many states sports
betting is now legal”). In that regard, as of Oct. 25, 2021, sports betting is legal and
operational in thirty states and the District of Columbia, and legal but not yet
operational in three states. See Interactive Map: Sports Betting in the U.S., AM.
GAMING ASS’N, https://www.americangaming.org/research/state-gaming-map/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2021).
158
Id.
159
The CFTC also or instead could determine that the underlier for a sports swap
falls within the 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19) Carveout within the excluded commodity
definition.
160
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671. But see
Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz ErisX RSBIX NFL Contracts and
Certain Event Contracts: Any Given Sunday in the Futures Market, supra note 110,
at 2 (“practically any event has at least a minimal financial, commercial, or economic
consequence”); Commissioner Bart Chilton, Dissent from Approval of Media
Derivatives Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Futures and
Binary Option Contracts 2 (June 14, 2010) (stating that whether a certain movie star
dies or becomes disabled “could have economic consequences.”).
161
2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,671.
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on “[w]hat calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be appropriate in
determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency will result in a
financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified in . . . [the
excluded commodity definition].”162 To date, the Commission has not
definitively answered these questions.163
Another way that the CFTC could decide to permit sports bets beyond
swaps between ECP counterparties would be to revise or withdraw Rule 40.11(a)
to permit sports gaming event contracts. This would enable the agency to avoid
determining that a sports bet does not have “a potential financial, economic, or
commercial consequence” and thus fall outside Rule 40.11(a). However, the
Commission would need to provide some justification for revising or
withdrawing the rule to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act.
Justifications might include the changing federal and state legal framework
related to sports betting and attitudes from both Congress and the general public
on sports betting becoming more favorable.164
C. CEA § 4c(b)
As discussed, the CFTC and various courts have held that binary options
are options, or otherwise treated them as such.165 Thus, if the CFTC considered
sports bets to constitute binary options, it could potentially use its CEA § 4c(b)
plenary options authority to permit sports gambling to exist legally. There is
potential conflict between the CFTC’s plenary options authority under CEA
§ 4c(b) and its obligations under Dodd-Frank § 712(d). Under Dodd-Frank, the
CFTC and SEC are obligated to further define the term “swap” jointly, in
consultation with the Federal Reserve Board.166 Although the CFTC and SEC
have already further defined the term swap in the Swap Adopting Release, it is
unclear whether this action effectively satisfies the CFTC’s obligations under
Dodd-Frank and frees the Commission to use CEA § 4c(b) without the SEC’s
input. The CFTC has stated, both jointly with the SEC and in a separate
rulemaking, that options are swaps.167 But the CFTC has also observed that:
Id. at 25,673. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19) defines the term “excluded commodity” as any
one of the items listed in four categories.
163
At the same time, at least one current and one former Senator likely expected
that at least certain sport event contracts fell into the excluded commodity
definition. See supra note 81.
164
See Michael Ricciardelli, Nat’l Poll: 80% of Americans Support Legalized
Sports Betting, THE SETON HALL SPORTS POLL (Oct. 10, 2019),
http://blogs.shu.edu/sportspoll/2019/10/10/natl-poll-80-of-americans-supportlegalized-sports-betting/ (“Americans have embraced legalized betting on sports,
bolstered by a Supreme Court ruling that okayed a state-by-state determination.”).
165
See supra notes 130 and 131.
166
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1).
167
See 77 Fed. Reg. 48,236 (Aug. 13. 2012) (“commodity options are swaps under
the statutory swaps definition[.]”); Commodity Options, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,320,
162
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“while the Dodd-Frank Act included numerous amendments to the CEA, the
plenary options authority provision in CEA section 4c(b) was not
amended . . . .”168
There is a similar potential conflict between the CFTC’s plenary options
authority under CEA § 4c(b) and Dodd-Frank § 712(d)(4). Dodd-Frank
§ 712(d)(4) states that any interpretation of, or guidance by, either the CFTC or
SEC regarding a provision of Title VII of Dodd-Frank “shall be effective only if
issued jointly by the [CFTC] and the [SEC]” after consultation with the Federal
Reserve Board in cases where Title VII requires both the CFTC and SEC to issue
joint regulations to implement the provision. Arguably, any interpretation or
guidance by the CFTC dealing with whether sports bets are options or other
swaps would implicate Dodd-Frank § 712(d)(4).
If instead, without any interpretation or definition, the CFTC simply
proceeded under CEA § 4c(b) to grant relief to sports bets that are binary or other
types of options, it may be able to avoid entanglement in Dodd-Frank § 712(d).
It may be difficult, however, to grant such relief without establishing the
parameters of sports bets subject to relief, and to discern whether that would
constitute guidance or if granting relief under § 4c(b) would inherently be
defining sports bets as options, thus implicating Dodd-Frank § 712(d)(1).
D. CEA § 4(c) Order
The purpose of § 4(c) is “to promote responsible economic or financial
innovation and fair competition.”169 The CFTC could potentially exempt sports
betting pursuant to § 4(c) of the CEA from the requirements in §§ 2(e) and
5c(c)(5)(C).170 Section 4(c) confers exemptive authority on the CFTC with
respect to the provisions of the CEA, with certain specified exceptions that do

25,322 (Apr. 27, 2012) (“Options Adopting Release”) (“the Dodd-Frank Act
includes a definition of swap that encompasses commodity options”).
168
Id.
169
7 USCA § 7(e)(2). See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rostin Behnam on
the Exemption from Derivatives Clearing Organization Registration, COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N
(July
11,
2019),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement071119
(citing House Conference Report 102–978, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3213 for the
proposition that, “In enacting section 4(c), Congress noted that the purpose of the
provision ‘is to give to the Commission a means of providing certainty and stability
to existing and emerging markets so that financial innovation and market
development can proceed in an effective and competitive manner.’”).
170
In the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, the CFTC noted that it could use its
CEA § 4(c) exemptive authority to “to establish a set of regulatory provisions
applicable to a defined class of products,” and asked in question 17 whether that
would be appropriate. 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at
25,673.
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not include §§ 2(e) and 5c.171 However, there are some swap requirements from
which § 4(c) does not allow the CFTC to provide exemptions—such as
§§ 2(a)(13) (real-time reporting), 4r (regulatory reporting) and 4s (swap dealer
requirements)—so those would still apply, making it onerous (but not
impossible) to operate a retail business.
In granting an exemption under § 4(c), the CFTC must find the
exemption consistent with the public interest and the purposes of the CEA172 and
that the exempted contracts be entered into by “appropriate persons.” 173 If the
CFTC were to use its exemptive authority, state laws would be preempted
pursuant to CEA § 12(e)(2)(B). However, the CFTC could conceivably condition
an exemption from CEA § 2(e) on the applicable parties’ compliance with state
laws regulating sports betting, including any licensing requirements. Further, the
CFTC could rely on this state law compliance condition as part of its
determination that the exemption is consistent with the public interests and the
purposes of the CEA, and that members of the general public are “appropriate
persons.”174 Alternatively, an exemption from § 5c(c)(5)(C) (and related CFTC
regulations, such as Rule 40.11(a)) would allow DCMs to list sports betting
contracts.
One benefit that the Commission has in using CEA § 4(c) is “the
discretion to grant an exemption to certain classes of transactions without having
to make a determination that such transactions are subject to the Act in the first

171

7 U.S.C.§ 2(c)(2)(D) (leveraged retail commodity transactions) also are not
excepted, so if there was a concern that sports bets were prohibited by 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(c)(2)(D), the CFTC could grant § 6(c) relief from § 2(c)(2)(D).
172
7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(2)(A). But see 2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note
40, at 25,672 (“As demonstrated by the [Iowa Electronic Markets (“IEM”)],
innovative event markets have the capacity to facilitate the discovery of information,
and thereby provide potential benefits to the public.”). The IEM is discussed infra in
Section V.F.
173
7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(2)(B)(ii).
174
See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(2) (listing determinations that the CFTC must make as a
condition of issuing a § 6(c) exemption); 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(3)(K) (defining
“appropriate persons” as such persons not listed in 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(3)). But see David
Aron & Alexander Kane, Federal Regulation Could Sweeten the Sports Betting Pot,
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 9, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankinglaw/insight-federal-regulation-could-sweeten-the-sports-betting-pot
(giving
examples of how sport gaming businesses take advantage of customers), (stating that
states’ rules make it “extremely difficult for new online operators to offer
competitive products”); 7 U.S.C. § 19(b) (requiring that “[t]he Commission shall
take into consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws and
endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives of [the
CEA], as well as the policies and purposes [thereof] . . . in issuing any order or
adopting any Commission rule or regulation (including any exemption under section
6(c) or 6c(b)) . . . .”).
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instance.”175 Using § 4(c) may176 also have the salutary effect of not needing to
work jointly with the SEC to issue relevant rules pursuant to Dodd-Frank
§ 712(d)(1), or an interpretation pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 712(d)(4).177
Obviously, one agency can move more quickly than two can, though “quickly”
is a relative term when it comes to federal agencies, even relatively nimbler ones
like the CFTC.
E. Joint “Consumer Contracts” Interpretation with the SEC Pursuant to DoddFrank § 712(d)(4)
In the Swap Adopting Release, the CFTC and the SEC provided an
interpretation stating that specified consumer agreements, contracts, and
transactions entered into by consumers primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes are not swaps (“Consumer Interpretation”).178 The
Consumer Interpretation was partly in response to comments on the advance
notice of proposed rulemaking,179 which preceded the proposal leading to the
Swap Adopting Release, pointing out “a number of areas in which a broad
reading
of
the
swap . . . [definition]
could
cover
certain
consumer . . . arrangements that historically have not been considered
swaps . . . .”180 The Commissions also observed that the Consumer Interpretation
was not intended to be an exhaustive list and “there may be other, similar types
of . . . transactions that also should not be considered to be swaps.”181 Thus, any
transaction type not in the Consumer Interpretation must be evaluated based on
its facts and circumstances, and the parties to such transactions may seek an
interpretation from the Commissions.182
However, the Commissions added that, “[i]n determining whether
similar types of . . . transactions entered into by consumers . . . are swaps[,]”
they would consider the following factors “that are common to the [specifically
excluded] consumer . . . transactions”: (1) a lack of payment obligations
severable from the transaction; (2) an absence of trading on an organized market
175

2008 Event Contract Concept Release, supra note 40, at 25,672.
See also Section V.C. for a discussion about the tension between 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)
and Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1), (4). There may be a similar tension between
those Dodd-Frank provisions and 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).
177
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1), (4). If the CFTC issues relief from the CEA
without first determining what type of products events contracts are, or whether these
contracts are subject to the CEA, that would seem to permit the CFTC to sidestep the
requirement to issue rules with the SEC.
178
See Swap Adopting Release, supra note 72, at 48,246–47. These included
consumer options to buy or sell property and interest rate locks related to completed
mortgages.
179
Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,429 (Aug. 20, 2010).
180
See Swap Adopting Release, supra note 72, at 48,246.
181
Id. at 48,247.
182
Swap Adopting Release, supra note 72, at 48,248.
176

92

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1

or over-the-counter; and (3) the involvement of an asset of which the consumer
is the owner or beneficiary or is buying or of a service provided, or to be
provided, by or to the consumer.183
It seems unlikely that the CFTC or SEC would consider sports betting
to be a service provided, or to be provided, by or to the consumer within the
meaning of the Consumer Interpretation. There has been a preemption provision
in the CEA related to state gambling and bucket shop laws for years due to a
concern that CFTC-regulated futures contracts or products which the CFTC
exempted from regulation would otherwise be banned by state law. Up until
Murphy, most states prohibited gambling. Given longstanding industry concern
that swaps could be considered futures, it is unlikely that sports betting would be
considered arrangements “that historically have not been considered swaps”
within the meaning of the Consumer Interpretation. Nevertheless, due to its openended facts and circumstance reference, the Consumer Interpretation is a
potential vehicle for the CFTC to use in providing relief to the sports gaming
industry.
F. Staff No-Action Letter
The CFTC staff sometimes issues a no-action letter (“NAL”) when an
action or failure to act would be unlawful but there is some overriding policy
reason that leads the staff to issue a NAL anyway. The CFTC staff could issue a
NAL184 stating that the staff of the relevant division(s) would not recommend
that the CFTC take enforcement action based on state-authorized sports or event
betting.185
Although the CFTC staff has issued NALs in the past to permit limited
event contract trading, it has not permitted open season on sports betting via a
NAL to the entire industry. The staff has, however, issued a number of industrywide NALs applicable to broad categories of regulated entities and market
participants, so it does not seem out of the question for sports betting.186 In 1993,
183

Id. at 48,247.
17 C.F.R. § 140.99(a)(2) states that a NAL is “a written statement issued by the
staff of a Division of the Commission or of the Office of the General Counsel that it
will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission for failure to comply
with a specific provision of the Act or of a Commission rule, regulation or order if a
proposed transaction is completed or a proposed activity is conducted . . . .” A NAL
“binds only the issuing Division or the Office of the General Counsel, as applicable,
and not the Commission or other Commission staff.” Id. Furthermore, “[o]nly the
[b]eneficiary[, and not third parties] may rely upon the no-action letter.” Id.
185
The CFTC considered exactly that in the 2008 Event Contract Concept Release,
supra note 40, at 25,673 (asking “[i]s the issuance of staff no-action relief, such as
the relief issued to the IEM, an appropriate or preferable means for establishing
regulatory certainty for event contracts and markets?”).
186
See, e.g., CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 20-39, 2020 WL 7013381
(Nov. 24, 2020); CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 20-42, 2020 WL 7258889
184
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staff issued a NAL to IEM, an electronic trading facility that functions as an
experimental and academic program, to list various event contracts, subject to
conditions and limitations.187 The letter’s relief extends to IEM contracts based
on political elections, economic indicators, and certain currency exchange rates.
In 2014, CFTC staff issued a NAL to the Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand,188 permitting it to “to operate a not-for-profit market for event contracts,
and to offer event contracts to U.S. persons, without registration as a DCM,
foreign board of trade, or SEF, and without registration of its operators.”189

VII. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Even if the CFTC does not bring a sports betting-related enforcement
action, sports gaming businesses may be liable if an individual brings a private
right of action claiming that the sports gaming business violated the CEA and
caused actual damages. CEA § 22(a) provides that “[a]ny person (other than a
registered entity or registered futures association) who violates this chapter or
who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces, or procures the commission of a
violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting” from the
purchase or sale of a swap, among other things. Additionally, private lawsuits
may highlight the need for more aggressive CFTC regulation 190 and prompt the
CFTC to bring its own enforcement action.

(Dec. 4, 2020); CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 19-08, 2019 WL 1571306
(Apr. 5, 2019) (related to Brexit); CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 19-26,
2019 WL 7040373 (Dec. 17, 2019) (LIBOR transition).
187
CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 93-66, 1993 WL 595741 (June 18,
1993),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documen
ts/letter/93-66.pdf.
188
CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 14-130, 2014 WL 5499971 (Oct. 29,
2014),
https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/14130.pdf.
189
See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Staff Provides No-Action Relief for Victoria
University of Wellington, New Zealand, to Operate a Not-For-Profit Market for
Event Contracts and to Offer Event Contracts to U.S. Persons, Release No. 7047-14
(October 29, 2014), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7047-14.
190
See David Aron & Alexander Kane, Federal Regulation Could Sweeten the
Sports
Betting
Pot,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(June
9,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/insight-federal-regulation-couldsweeten-the-sports-betting-pot (giving examples of how sport gaming businesses
take advantage of customers).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
To date, the CFTC has not sued any state-authorized sports betting
businesses in the United States since Murphy, notwithstanding that: (1) sports
bets may be characterized as options or other types of swaps, each of which are
regulated by the CFTC and unavailable (legally) to non-ECPs other than on, or
subject to the rules of, a DCM; and (2) the CFTC has pursued a number of
offshore binary options businesses, and some with U.S. operations, that are not
registered with the CFTC and that offer binary options to non-ECP U.S.
persons.191 Moreover, at least one CFTC Commissioner has stated publicly that
he is open to CFTC-sanctioned sports betting under the right circumstances.192
Therefore, it will be interesting to see how the CFTC will decide to treat statelicensed sports betting businesses in the future, especially given that only three
years ago, the Supreme Court opened the door for states to legalize sports betting,
which has the potential to generate significant tax revenue.193
Given the popularity of sports betting among the general public and
Commissioner Berkovitz’s views that sports betting should be permitted on

See, e.g., Complaint, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Jared J. Davis,
Case No. 3:19-cv-2140 (N.D. OH, Western Division), ECF No. 1 (alleging Davis
fraudulently solicited and accepted payment from customers to trade off-exchange
binary options); Settlement Order, In re Curtis Dalton, CFTC No. 19–17, 2019 WL
3491961 (July 19, 2019) (settlement related to Dalton allegedly offering to enter into,
entering into, and confirming the execution of illegal off-exchange binary options);
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Filed Enforcement Actions Against Two Affiliate
Marketers for Binary Options Fraud, Release No. 8047-19 (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8047-19 (describing a pair of
enforcement actions against two affiliate marketers, David Sechovich and Peter
Szatmari, for creating and disseminating fraudulent solicitations to open and fund
retail binary options trading); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Multiple Forex
and Binary Options Dealers with Registration Violations, Release No. 7785-18
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7785-18
(describing an order settling charges against eight unregistered entities and eight
unregistered individuals that offered binary options to retail investors).
192
See Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz related to Review of ErisX
Certification of NFL Future Contracts, supra note 121, at 1.
193
See Legal US Sports Betting Revenue, Handle and Tax Totals Since PASPA
Repeal, SPORTS HANDLE, https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-revenue/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2021(listing total state tax revenue sports from sports gambling since
Murphy v. NCAA as $614,789,646). But see Jackson Brainerd, The Early Bets Are
In: Is Sports Betting Paying Off?, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/the-early-bets-are-in-issports-betting-paying-off.aspx (“States looking to close budget gaps with sports
betting revenue may be disappointed, especially as more and more states legalize and
take their slice of the market”).
191
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CFTC-regulated DCMs under appropriate circumstances,194 the authors believe
it is likely that the CFTC will permit sports betting products subject to its
regulation in some form.

194

See, e.g., Emma Newburger, Schumer Proposes Federal Legislation to
Decriminalize
Marijuana,
CNBC
(July
14,
2021,
12:51
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/14/schumer-proposes-federal-legislation-todecriminalize-marijuana-.html. One cannot help but notice the parallel dichotomies
between the federal and state approaches to marijuana and sports betting.

